Publications since 2004 (MOVE Researchers in bold) divided into sections:

Social Choice - Voting:

R. Arlegi, M.A. Ballester, M. Besada, J.R. de Miguel, J. Nieto and C. Vázquez, “On the equivalence of the two existing extensions of the leximax criterion to the infinite case,” Mathematical Social Sciences 54, 238-243 (2007).

M.A. Ballester  and J. Alcalde-Unzu, “Some remarks on ranking opportunity sets and Arrow impossibility results: correspondence results,” Journal of Economic Theory 124, 116-123 (2005).

M.A. Ballester and J. Apesteguia, “A theory of reference-dependent behavior,” Economic Theory, forthcoming.

M.A. Ballester and T. Calvo, “Lever aggregation operators,” Fuzzy Sets and Systems, forthcoming.

M.A. Ballester and J.L. García-Lapresta, “A recursive group decision making procedure for choosing qualified individuals,” International Journal of Intelligent Systems, forthcoming.

M.A. Ballester and J.L. García-Lapresta, “Sequential consensus for selecting qualified individuals of a group,” International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems 16, 57-68 (2008).

M.A. Ballester and J.L. García-Lapresta, “A model of elitist qualification,” Group Decision and Negotiation 17, 497-513 (2008).

M.A. Ballester and J.R.de Miguel, “On freedom of choice and infinite sets: the Suprafinite Rule,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 42, 291-300 (2006).

M.A. Ballester, J.R. de Miguel and J. Nieto, “Set comparisons in a general domain: the indirect utility criterion,” Mathematical Social Sciences 48, 139-150 (2004).

M.A. Ballester and P. Rey-Biel, “Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms,” Social Choice and Welfare, forthcoming.

S. Barberà and D. Coelho, “On the rule of k names,” Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming.

S. Barberà and D. Coelho, “How to choose a non-controversial list with k names,” Social Choice and Welfare 31, 79-96 (2008).

S. Barberà and M.O. Jackson, “On the weights of nations: assigning voting weights in a heterogeneous union,” Journal of Political Economy 114, 317-339 (2006).

S. Barberà and M.O. Jackson, “Choosing how to choose: self-stable majority rules and constitutions,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 1011-1048 (2004).

S. Barberà, J. Massó and A. Neme, “Voting by committees under constraints,” Journal of Economic Theory 122, 185-205 (2005). 

S. Barberà and C. Beviá, “Locating public facilities by majority: stability, consistency and group formation,” Games and Economic Behavior 56, 185-200 (2006).

C. Beviá and H. Llavador, “The informational value of incumbency,” Journal of Public Economic Theory, forthcoming. 

Caballé, J. and Esteban, J., “Stochastic Dominance and Absolute Risk Aversion”, Social Choice and Welfare 28, 89-110, 2007. 

D. Brown and C. Calsamiglia, “The nonparametric approach to applied welfare analysis,” Economic Theory 31, 183-188 (2007).

C. Calsamiglia, “Decentralizing Equality of Opportunity”, International Economic Review 50, 273-290 (2009).

S. Huck and P. Rey-Biel, “Endogenous leadership in teams,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 162, 1-9 (2006).

D. Berga, G. Bergantiños, J. Massó and A. Neme, “On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit,” Economics Bulletin 4, 1-9, (2008).

D. Berga, G. Bergantiños, J. Massó and A. Neme, “An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit,” Mathematical Social Sciences 54, 152-175 (2007).

D. Berga, G. Bergantiños, J. Massó and A. Neme, “On exiting after voting,“ International Journal of Game Theory 34, 33-54 (2006).

D. Berga, G. Bergantiños, J. Massó and A. Neme, “Stability of voting by committees with exit,” Social Choice and Welfare 23, 229-247 (2004).  

J. Massó and M. Vorzats, “Weighted approval voting,” Economic Theory 36, 129-146 (2008).

J. Massó and J. Nicolò, “Efficient and stable collective choice under gregarious preferences,” Games and Economic Behavior 64, 591-611 (2008).

J. Massó and A. Neme, “Bribe-proof rules in the division problem,” Games and Economic Behavior 61, 331-343 (2007).

J. Massó and A. Neme, “A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem,” Social Choice and Welfare 23, 187-206 (2004).

 

Game Theory:

S. Bade, G. Haeringer and L. Renou, “Bilateral commitment,” Journal of Economic Theory 144, 1817-1831 (2009).

S. Bade, G. Haeringer and L. Renou, “More strategies, more Nash equilibria,” Journal of Economic Theory 135, 551-557 (2007).

S. Barberà and A. Gerber, “A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games,” Economics Letters 95, 85-90 (2007).

C. Beviá and L. Corchón, “Cooperative production and efficiency,” Mathematical Social Sciences 67, 143-154 (2009).

C. Beviá and L. Corchón, “Rational sabotage in cooperative production with heterogeneous agents,” The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economivs (Topics) 6, article 16 (2006).

G. Haeringer, “A new weight scheme for the Shapley value,” Mathematical Social Sciences 52, 88-98 (2006).

G. Haeringer, “Equilibrium binding agreements,” Journal of Economic Theory 117, 140-143 (2004).

I. Macho-Stadler, D. Pérez-Castrillo and N. Porteiro, “Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements,” International Journal of Game Theory 34, 207-228 (2006).

I. Macho-Stadler, D. Pérez-Castrillo and D. Wettstein, “Sharing the surplus: a just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities,” Journal of Economic Theory 135, 339-356 (2007).

I. Macho-Stadler, D. Pérez-Castrillo and D. Wettstein, “Efficient bidding with externalities,” Games and Economic Behavior 57, 304-320 (2006).

S. Mutuswami, D. Pérez-Castrillo and D. Wettstein, “Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments,” Games and Economic Behavior 48, 111-123 (2004).

D. Pérez-Castrillo, Veszteg R., “Choosing a Common Project: Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 63, 394-411 (2007).

D. Pérez-Castrillo and D. Wettstein, “An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments,” Journal of Economic Theory 127, 296-308 (2006).

D. Pérez-Castrillo and D. Wettstein, “Implementation of the ordinal Shapley value for a three-agent economy,” Economics Bulletin 3, 1-8 (2005).

D. Pérez-Castrillo and D. Wettstein, “Forming efficient networks,” Economics Letters 87, 83-97 (2005).

P. Rey-Biel, “Equilibrium play and best response to (stated) beliefs in normal form games,” Games and Economic Behavior 65, 572-585 (2009).

P. Rey-Biel, “Inequality aversion and team incentives,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 110, 297-320 (2008).

X. Vilà, “A Model-to-Model Analysis of Bertrand Competition,” Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation (JASSS) 11, 2, 11 (2008).

 

Matching:

C. Calsamiglia, G. Haeringer and F. Klijn, “Constrained school choice: An experimental study,” American Economic Review, forthcoming.

K. Dam and D. Pérez-Castrillo, “The principal-agent matching market,” The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Advances) 2, article 1 (2006).

L. Ehlers and J. Massó, “Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets,” Journal of Economic Theory 136, 587-600 (2007).

G. Haeringer and F. Klijn, “Constrained school choice,” Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.

B. Klaus, F. Klijn and J. Massó, “Some things couples wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask),” Review of Economic Design 11, 175-184 (2007).

R. Martínez, J. Massó, A. Neme and J. Oviedo, “On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles,” International Journal of Game Theory 36, 497-518 (2008).

R. Martínez, J. Massó, A. Neme and J. Oviedo, “On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model,” International Journal of Game Theory 33, 115-128 (2004).

R. Martínez, J. Massó, A. Neme and J. Oviedo, “An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings,” Mathematical Social Sciences 47, 187-210 (2004).